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A REIrIEW AND APPRAISAL OF
THE MONETARYAND OTHER
FINANCIAL POLICIES IN THE
FEI'ERAL GOVERNMENT
BUDGET FOR rgg7*
By

Dr. M. O. Ojo,
Director of Research, Central Bank of Nigeria

INTRODUCTION
Monetary management

has

ductive activities has not picked up
sufficiently is" sending the signal

been quite successful in Nigeria in

that stabilization efforts cannot be

the last two years (1995/1996).

relaxed. It is against this background

This was mainly because virtually
all key macroeconomic policies
have moved together in the same
direction. Thishas, toa large extent,
supported the contention of the
monetary authorities in the past
decade or so that when monetary
policy is appropriately complemented by other policies such as

that the monetary and other
financial policies recently announced for fiscal 7997 have lo be
evaluated. Specifically, this paper
should be able to provide an answer

to the question: can

monetary

policy cope with the seemingly

consolidation designed to build on

appropriate background to the

and eliminate direct credit controls

is still creating some doubt in the
minds of economic operators. Many
c,bservers fear that interest rates
might once more rise to unprecedented levels as happened in the
past when total deregulation wad
adopted. In addition. the buoyant
liquidity situation in the economy
at a time when the pace ol pro-

The 1996 Federal Government

Budget was one of f iscal
the modest gains achievedin

economy?

sustained. With .the benefit of
hindsight, the recent action to
liberalise the interest rate regime

AND
APPRAISAL OF
FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC
CONDTTIONS IN 1996

increasing challenge of stabilization

large measure of macroeconomic
stability can be achieved. However,

monetary policy if macroeconomic
stability is to be enhanced and

2. A REVIEW

and growth of the Nigerian

fiscal and external sector policies. a

recent developments in the
economy appear to indicate that
more challenges are f acing

Dr. M. O. Ojo,
Director of Research,
Central Bank of Nigeria

In order to provide an

central focus of the paper which is
to review and appraise lhe 1997
monetary policy package, an
attempt is made in the second
section of the paper to analyse the
recent financial and economic
conditions in the Nigerian economy after which the basis and
elements of the monetary programme for 1997 are outlined in
section three. Section four contains
an articulation of some implementation modalities for the 1997
monetary programme. The final
Section summarises and concludes
the paper.

1995.
The Budget sought to raise real
output growth rate from 2.2o/o to
5.0o/o; reduce the rate of inflation
from72.8o/o to 3070; and maintain

a more favourable

balance of

payments position. A tight
monetary policy regime was

designed to be complemented by a

prudent fiscal stance so as to
moderate inflationary pressures,
strengthen external sector
performance, stabilize the naira
exchange rate and enhance output

growth. Open Market Operations
(OMO)continued to be the principal
instrument of monetary management supported by the use of the
rediscount rate and statutory reserve
requirements. Specific monetary

policy initiatives included the
restoration of the Repurchase

-A Paper presented
during the Policy Seminar on the 1997 Federal Government Budget organised by the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN), National Centre for Economic Management and Administraticn (NCEMA) and the Nigerian Economic Society (NES) at the
Nigerian lnstitute of lnternationalAffairs (NllA), Lagos, February 25, 1997.
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Agreement (REPO) with the
discount houses (suspended in
1995); the phasing out of the
mandatory bank credit allocations
effective from
October, 7996: the exemption of
the merchant banks from the cash
reserve requirement with effed.
from Augusl1996; the removalof
the cap on interest rates from
October 1996; and the gradual
release of the outstanding stock of
stabilization securities to the banks
and approval for active trading in
the outstanding balances of such
securities held by the banks in the
inter-bank market.
The monetary and financial
conditions in1996 emanating from
policy implementation and
associated developments were
characterised by relatively modest
growth in monetary aggregates for
the second consecutive year,
general compliance by banks with
regard to the maximum lending
rate policy pre5cription, some
reduction in the pressures on the
balance of payments position,
stability in the naira exchange rate,
a lower inflation rate and modest
growth in real output. The statistical

lo preferred sectors

evidence

is quite revealing.

Provisional data showed that M1
grew by 28.6%in7996 compared
with the target of 14.5o/o.while M2
increased by 29.8o/o as against the
target of 16.80/o (Table 1). The
higher monetary growth in 1996
was caused by the expansionary
tendency in the last four months of
the year, but on an average basis.
monetary growth in 1996 and
1995 were significantly more
tolerable than in the previous four
years. The major expansionary
factors influencing money supply
were the increases in net domestic
credit and net foreign assets of the
banking systern. Total net domestic
credit increased by 12.0o/o
compared with the targel of I 2. 0o/0.
While credit to the government
22

Interest rates were generally
within the stipulated maximum.

llfting of the restrictions placed on
one of such institutions during the
year, thereby putting the number
of distressed banks at 52 as at the
end of December, L996. However,
Holding Action was imposed on
another bank during the latter part

Most deposit rates moved up, while

of the year, while 5 banks had been

sector increased bv 76.90/o (0.0olo
was anticipated). private sector
demand for credit increased by
20.7o/o much less than the 29.5o/o

anticipated.

lending rates declined in many
cases. As in the past, OMO was
conducted by the CBN in the

in liquidation since 1995.

secondary market for treasury bills

Furthermore, the CBN intensified
its surveillance and monitoring
activities on banks and other

through transactions

financial institutions through

in the

securities with the discount houses
as principaldealers. The volume of

transactions (sales) increased
substantially from N158.2 billion
in 1995to N234.8billion in1996.
The strong demand for short-dated
treasury bills was attributable to a

number of factors, including the
slow growth in private sector
borrowing from the banking system
partly due to the lull in economic
activities and partly to the cap on
lending rates for the greater part of
the year; the shortage of alternative
money market assets following the
conversion of all treasury certificates

outstanding into bonds; the
generally weak demand for foreign
exchange: the injection of additional

liquidity into the banking system
through the disbursements by the
Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund
(PTR, expansionary government
fiscal operations, and the phased
release of banks' mandatory
investments in the stabilization
securities and the merchant banks'

exemption from cash reserve
requirement.

The distress in the banking
system moderated slightly in the

review period following the
sustained implementation of the
failure resolution f ramework
introduced since 7994. ln
particular, action by the CBN to
review banks' compliance with
conditions for the lifting of the
Holding Actions placed on some
distressed banks resulted in the

routine, target and special
examinations. In keeping with the
policy of sanitising the banking
industry, some investigations were
also carried out on cases of alleged
malpractice by some banks, while
many spot checks were undertaken
to determine compliance by banks
with respect to the provisions of
the monetary policy guidelines.
The authorities continued to
implement and review the distress
resolution strategies f or the financial
sector. In this context, five (5) out of
the seventeen (77) banks taken
over by the CBN in September
1995, forwhich court approvalfor
acquisition had been granted, had
been offered for sale. Also. the
authorities continued to arraign
insider abusers and other delinquent
debtors who contributed to the
adversity of those banks before the
Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts)
and Financial Malpractices Tribunal
with good results. as substantial
debt recoveries were made. This
has helped to improvethe networth
of these banks. For instance. as at

the end of December 1996,
distressed banks' net total assets
increased to N57.7 billion or 14.0
per cent of the entire system's assets
from N52.5 billion or 13.0 per
cent of the total as at December
1995. Similarly, their share of the
deposit liabilities of the aggregate
for the banking system amounted
to N41.2 billion compared with
N37.4 billion in the corresponding
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period of 1995.
The overall deficit in the balance
payments
during the first half of
of
7996for which information is firm
was estimated to be US$336.7
million compared with the US$572.5

areas which were the focus of
policies were as follows:

the

yment and persistent external
sector payments deficit;
(ii) The problem of excess liquidity
persisted and the prospects for
an increase in the level of such
excess liquidity in 7997 are
real. Other major problems in
the financial sector were the
negative real interest rate
regime and the presence of a

million recorded in

corresponding period of 1995. The
deficit was traceable to the sharp
deterioration in the capital account.
In sharp contrast to the trend in
earlier years, the current accourrt
swung to a surplus of US$587.8
million, a development attributable
to the substantial improvement in
the merchandise trade account and

the improved surplus in

the

unrequited transfers account. Other

notable developments

in

the

external sector were the continued
stability in the AFEM exchange

rate as well as the substantial
increase in the nation's external
reserves from US$1,413.0 million
to US$4,074.7 million in 1996.
Real Sector developments
indicated that economic
management recorded some
achievement. Real GDP groMh
rate increased from 2.2 to 3.3o/o.
Both agricultural and industrial
production increased relative to
1995, while the overall rate of

manufacturing capacity utilization
increased from 29.3 to 32.50/0.

The unemployment problem
generally worsened, while
inflationary pressures moderated
considerably with the inflation rate
standing al 29.3o/o in December,
1 9 96 compared with 7 2.8o/o aye.ar
earlier.
In summary, whilethe financial
and economic conditions in 1996
weYe more favourable, relative to
1995 and 1,994, better economic
performance could have been
achieved to support more rapid
economicrecovery. Thus, the 1997
Budget soughtto identifythe major
outstanding economic problems to
be addressed in the course of the
fiscal year. Some of the problem

(i) The macroeconomic

problems
a high inflation rate,

include
inadequate output growth,
worsening state of unemplo-

large number of

distressed
institutions;
(iii) While there has been evidence
of fiscal prudence, there has
nevertheless been increased
government borrowing from
the banking system. Besides,
more rigorous execution of the
political transition programme
will require further growth in
government expenditure;
(iv) In the externalsector, the main
problems were inadequate
foreign exchange reserves, low
value of the naira, persistent
adverse terms of trade and
heavy external debt bwden I and
(v) In the real sector, output growth
continued to be inadequate and
the cost of production remained
high, while the level of new
investment was relatively low.
Another major problem was
the deteriorating conditions of
the socialservices - education,
health and water supply, as
well as the continued degradation of the environment.

3. FEATURES

OF THE

}'lONETARY
PROGRAMME FOR 1997

In the light of the above
outstanding problems of the
Nigerian economy, monetary policy
in 7997 is expected to continue to

play its supportive roles of

stabilization and efficient resource
allocation. Thus, while the stance
of monetary policy will continue to
be restrictive, lhe financial sector
would provide adequate funding

for private sector productive

activities. Monetary policy
objectives for fiscal 1997 include:

(i) a significant reduction in the
inflation rate;

of output and
employment growth; and
(iii) strengthening external sector
performance and ensuring
continued naira exchange rate
stability.
The monetary programme
assumes a GDP growth rate of
about 5.0 per cent, an inflation
rate of not more than 15.0 per cent
and some modest accretion to
external reserves. The choice of
(ii) stimulation

this alternative indicates the
following monetary and credit
targets for 7997:

(i) growth in abroad

(M2) and

narrow (M1) money not

exceeding 15.7 and 1,3.5 per
cent, respectively;
(ii) an increase of not more than
20.0 per centin aggregatebank
creditto the domestic econom!;
(iii) increases of bank credit not
exceeding 5.3 and 39.8 per
cent to the government and
private sector, respectiveb; and
(iv) an increase of not more than
16.0 per cent in the domestic
assets of the banking system.
Most, of the monetary policy
measures adopted in the recent
past to attain policy objectives are
retained in 1997 as contained in
the Monetary Policy Circular No.
31. lvlention should be made of key
policy instruments and measures:

(i) Open Market

Operations

(OMO) will continue to be the
major instrument of monetary
poiicy and will, as usual, be
sr-rpporled bythe use of discount
window and reserve
requirement policies. Horvever.

23

The Committee, to be
chaired by the Federal
Minister of Finance. has as
members the CBN, NDIC,
SEC and National Insurance Commission.
25

far to improve fiscal discipline and

the deregulation of interest rates.
Apart from the issue of appropriate pricing of government
securities, discussed in the next
sub-section, the biggest Problem
facing the use of OMO instrument

actions that

wili enhance the

instrument.

of its

OMO
including the

effectiveness

I

I

I

securitization of its direct advances
to the government, the rePlacement
of tne lo+fielding trea.sury bonds
(Q,hqiil*tgi:bb1e in the market)by
os
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separation

of the market

second place, the decapping of
interest rates with effect from
October 1996 should facilitate the
deepening and broadening of the
financial markets and provide an
efficient mechanism for liquidity

for

monetary and debt management
which is contrary to the present

practice

.ln addition,

mandatorY loans to rural
borrowers and small-scale

and allocation of financial
resources;

a negotiable instrument and clear

in the

primanr

issues

market. In the medium to long-run,
the CBN coul' consider a separate

probably held by the Bank itself as
it now obtains in some developing
countries such ai Ghana and Chile,
However, this has ser:,rlls cost
implications f,:r cen{ a bank
operations. Even when r central
bank issues its own inl, ',ention
instrument, th:re is ne, for coordination be ,rreen the ':al and
monetary au:lr rities. ,' ,)e-d, at
the early stag ' lf this ir:-.i ument,
it should be r I to support the
treasury secur li, .

a

transmission channelto the policy
goals, while as an indicator, it reveals
early signals of the economy's
monetary conditions.
To all intents and purposes,
interest rate management should
be easier in 7997 and beyond
provided the present conditions of
the financial markets persist and
indeed are enhanced. In the first

case, the

macroeconomic

distortions of the recent past have
reduced considerably. Such
distortions include the crowding
out of the private sector in credit
allocation, the use of stabilization
securities to mop up excess liquidity,
the large numberof insolventbanks
engaging in distress borrowing and
the skewed distribution of bank
reserues. These distortions have

since 7995 been effectively
countered bythe authgrities, In the

treasury bill tender market.
Depending on the CBN's
perception of the liquidity situation,

the weekly OMO will be used to
increase or drain bank reserves by
employing the cut-off price in the
transactions. This ap:proach
assumes that at a particular MRR,
there is also a given level of bank
reserves that is consistent with the

interest rate policy an active
instrument of liquidity management

and resource mobilization and
allocation. There are several
possibilities, all depending on the
prevailing profile of the financial
sector.
Many observers have suggested
that the Minimum Rediscount Rate
(MRR) should be the nominal
anchor for CBN's interest rate
poliry, which is saying the obvious.
The question to ask is, how? On

Interest Flate
Management
Interest rate management is
critical for the effecliveness of

the interest rate variable is

strive to defend. This implies that
the
movement in the bid rates in the

the CBN would monitor

removed, the monetary authorities
will face the challenges of making

4.2.

monetary policy. Interest rates can
be both a monetary target and a
monetary indicator. As a target,

and TBR would suggest the thrust
of policy which the CBN would

management in the banking system.
But as these distortions are being

intervention instrument, most

26

retained ln 7997

monetary conditions as wellas
enhance efficient mobilization

^-^-^|ian

d

sectors which became
effeclvefrom October 1996 is

pr eferr

in1997 such that its oPeration
will signal to the market
impending changes in

in the event of anticiPated resurgence of liquiditY in the
economy and a shortage of
treasury securities for effective
conduct of OMO, the CBN
would stand readY to issue its
own securities, with the clear

OMO cut-off price which

lending rates. As indicated earlier.
the financial conditions in Nigeria
today are quite delicate and may
not make the financial markets
readily susceptible to the application

of the standard interest rate

short-term basis, the primary

management. There is an overhang
of excess liquidity, whilethe treasury
bill issue market may not portray
the exact liquidity pressure in the
banking system. We have also raised

objective is to evolve an MRR which

i
j
I

also

determines banks' deposit and

is related to lending and deposit
rates through the regulation of
supply of bank reserves. In order to

the issue of the effectiveness of
OMO in our environment. Under
these circumstances, supplementary actions will need to be
adopted to evolve a viable
mechanism for interest rate

do this, the CBN would need to
have an appropriate indicator that

would suggest when to intervene in

the money market. International
experience shows that the MRR (or
more generally the Bank Rate (BR))
may be set either below or above

management. For instance, the
monetary authorities may need to
utilize available information on
interest rate developments in the
entire financial sector, create its
own open market intervention
instrument as suggested earlier, cooperate with the government to

market rates. In either case, the
spread between the BR and the
market rate (such as the inter-bank
funds rate) usually indicates the
thrust of policy. The centralbank's
open market operations through
its cut-off price can be used to
influence movements in the interbank rates. This series of complex
actions all depend on the
sophistication and responsiveness
of the financial markets. The
Nigerian financial markets are still

moralsuasion to ensure that interest
rates would perform their roles in
support of economic stability and
sustainable economic growth.

being nurtured. On an experimental
basis, the CBN's MRR could be set

4.3-

at a penalty mark-up over the
treasury bill issue rate (TBR) such
that the spread between the MRR

move resources between the banks

and the CBN and indeed apply

I

Improving the
Performance of the
Financial Sector
Deregulatory financial mea-

t\)
\o

o
o

tt

zo

TABLE 1
SELECTED MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1 99 1.1996
(PERCENT)
1992

1991

1

993

1994

1

995

7996

3/

T1/

A2/

T

A

T

A

T

A

74.6

32.8

24.3

66.4

20.0

54.6

21.4

47.8

9.4

8.1

14.5

28.6

32.7

26.8

49.2

18.0

49.8

14.8

39.1

10.1

10.3

i6.8

29.8

T

T

A

Growth in Monetary Aggregates
Money Supply (M1)
Money Supply (M2)
Domestic Credit

10.6

46.3

73.2

73.0

17.5

75.9

9.4

29.2

11.3

36.0

72.0

72.0

Credit to Private Sector

76.4

23.7

17.7

34.7

20.0

16.6

32.6

28.3

21.9

51.8

29.5

18.4

0.0

82.5

aa

109.6

74.6

720.7

0.0

27.7

5.6

27.6

0.0

16.9

Credit to Govemment

-11.0

-10.2

-15.4

-7.7

01

1.9

4.7

3.0

2.3

1.3

Z.Z

a.)

Manufacturing Capacity Utilization

39.4

41.8

37.2

30.4

29.3

32.5

lnflation Rate

13.0

44.5

c

t.z

57.0

72.8

29.3

9.9095

77.2985

22.0468

27.8867

Fiscal Deficit - GDP Ratio
Real GDP Growth

Average Exchange Rate (N/$)

- Official
- AFEM
Balance of Payrnents Position

(0/o

21.8861

21.8851

81.1491

81.2527

-3.1

-5.6

of GDP)

-

Overall

-5.1

-

-4.9
-3.9

-18.3

Current Account

-0.9

Extemal Reserves (US$ million)

4487

773

1

-2.4

-4.7
-5.4

-5.6

-0.7

330

I 659

1441

4074.7

NOTES

7/
2/
3/

T = Target
A = Achral
Provisional

L

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
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balance of payments position. The
expansion of CBN's supervisory
responsibilities to include all banking

institutions will certainly impose a
bigger demand on the capacity of
the Bank. but it should reduce
leakages in the overall monetary
control process. If some of the
actions suggested in the previous
section of this paper are taken, the
fiscal, external and real sector
components of the Budget should

provide a more conducive

environment for the financial sector

to meet the needs of the
economy.

entire
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